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†Aarhus University
Abstract—Nontransitive Noninterference (NTNI) and Nontran-
sitive Types (NTT) are a new security condition and enforcement
for policies which, in contrast to Denning’s classical lattice
model, assume no transitivity of the underlying flow relation.
Nontransitive security policies are a natural fit for coarse-grained
information-flow control where labels are specified at module
rather than variable level of granularity.
While the nontransitive and transitive policies pursue different
goals and have different intuitions, this paper demonstrates
that nontransitive noninterference can in fact be reduced to
classical transitive noninterference. We develop a lattice encoding
that establishes a precise relation between NTNI and classical
noninterference. Our results make it possible to clearly position
the new NTNI characterization with respect to the large body
of work on noninterference. Further, we devise a lightweight
program transformation that leverages standard flow-sensitive
information-flow analyses to enforce nontransitive policies. We
demonstrate several immediate benefits of our approach, both
theoretical and practical. First, we improve the permissiveness
over (while retaining the soundness of) the nonstandard NTT en-
forcement. Second, our results naturally generalize to a language
with intermediate inputs and outputs. Finally, we demonstrate
the practical benefits by utilizing state-of-the-art flow-sensitive
tool JOANA to enforce nontransitive policies for Java programs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern approaches to secure information flow follow Den-
ning’s classical model [8]. This model maps information to
security levels and uses a flow relation that regulates how
information can move between the levels. Under Denning’s
model, when data moves from one security level to another
one, it effectively looses its original security classification.
Denning therefore argues that in such a model, the flow
relation must be transitive, which has been the convention for
a large body of work on information flow control [32], [26],
[13].
Nontransitive policies In recent work, Lu and Zhang [17]
observe that in certain scenarios, the transitivity requirement
is in fact undesirable. This is most apparent when security
policies are specified in a coarse-grained manner, i.e., at the
level of mutually-distrustful components in an application. For
example, “component Alice may trust only another component
Bob with her information, however due to implied transitive
relations, her information may flow not only to Bob but also in-
directly to all components that Bob trusts, which is undesirable
for Alice” [17]. Another, more fine-grained example, is that of
user policies in a social network stipulating that “my friends
can access my personal data but not friends of my friends”.
To semantically characterize such security requirements, Lu
and Zhang propose the notion of nontransitive noninterference
(NTNI) and propose a specially designed type system to
statically enforce it.
Nontransitive noninterference is not to be confused with
intransitive noninterference [25], [23], [18], [30], a popular
model for declassification. Although both nontransitive and
intransitive policies assume flow relations are not transitive,
there is a conceptual difference between them. Assuming a
flow relation with flows from A to B and from B to C
but not from A to C, intransitive noninterference allows A’s
information to indirectly flow to C as long as the information
passes through a declassifier. In contrast, nontransitive policy
forbids all flows from A to C. Section VII elaborates the
relation in detail.
NTNI is introduced by a nonstandard security characteriza-
tion and a specialized type system [17]. The question remains
open whether the mainstream machinery of information-flow
control reasoning and enforcement can be leveraged for track-
ing NTNI.
This paper answers this question positively by showing how
to encode nontransitive noninterference via classical transi-
tive noninterference. Our encoding makes it possible to use
standard transitive techniques for information-flow control to
enforce nontransitive policies and thus address the coarse-
grained scenarios that motivate them. This has substantial
practical benefits, making it possible to deploy information-
flow concepts and tools to achieve nontransitive security.
We argue that flow-sensitive analysis is a natural fit for the
component-based scenario, where developers are not required
to provide fine-grained annotations at the level of variables.
We devise a lightweight program transformation to lever-
age flow-sensitive information-flow analysis to enforce NTNI.
Thanks to the flow-sensitivity of the analysis, the type system
verifies which variables are affected by what components,
enforcing component-level security. We implement a proto-
type of the transpiler, i.e., program transformer and policy
translator, and leverage flow-sensitive static tool JOANA [11]
to demonstrate our approach in practice.
Contributions The contributions of this paper are:
∙ We show that the definition of NTNI can be reduced to
classical transitive noninterference through a lattice encoding
(Section II).
∙ We leverage our encoding to show how an existing flow-
sensitive information-flow type system can enforce the
coarse-grained policies that motivate NTNI in the first place
(Section III).
∙ We extend our results to a language supporting interaction
through input and output commands (Section IV).
∙ We develop a prototype that translates NTNI policy to a
classical transitive setting and uses JOANA static analysis
tool (Section V).
II. SECURITY CHARACTERIZATION TRANSPILED
All permitted flows between security levels are expressed
explicitly under nontransitive policies, as opposed to the
traditional way [8] of policy specification where security
levels constitute a partially ordered set. Nontransitive policies
only have reflexive property, yet expressive enough to include
other properties such as transitivity and antisymmetry among
arbitrary selections of levels.
This section shows how nontransitive noninterference can
be modeled as transitive noninterference using a power-lattice
encoding. Throughout the paper, we use a running example
adopted from Lu and Zhang [17] to discuss how the tran-
spilation works. We formalize the security notions and prove
the relation between these two approaches to define a security
policy.
Running example Figure 1 shows our running example con-
sisting of three components named Alice, Bob, and Charlie.
The security policy stipulates that Bob is allowed to read
Alice’s information and Charlie is allowed to read Bob’s
information. At the same time, no information flow from Alice
is allowed to Charlie.
Based on the policy, Bob can only send information to
Charlie if it is not influenced by Alice, as illustrated in
Figure 2. A transitive policy would presume that if information
may flow from Alice to Bob and from Bob to Charlie, then
it may also flow from Alice to Charlie. This is not the
case in this example. Since nontransitive policies specify all
permitted flows explicitly, the information flow from Alice
to Charlie would be considered as desired only if it was
explicitly stated in the policy. It is indeed easy to see that












12 receive(x) { data1 = x; }
13 good() { Charlie.receive(data2); }




18 receive(x) { data = x; }
19 }
Figure 1: Running example [17].
Alice Bob Charlie
A B C
Figure 2: Nontransitive policy for the running example.
because transitive closures can be stated as permitted flows to
preserve the transitive property.
Using a coarse-grained information-flow control is sufficient
to specify the intended policy. Consider the labels A, B, and C
for the components Alice, Bob, and Charlie, respectively. We
specify the nontransitive policy using an arbitrary information
flow relation ⊵ 1, written A⊵B and B⊵C, which specifies that
information from security level A can flow to security level B
and from B to C. It also stipulates any other information flows
between the levels are disallowed. For instance, information
from security level A must not flow to C, directly or through
any other components.
For the sake of simplicity, we rewrite the example program
in a model language (without support for object-orientation)
that demonstrates the explicit flows arisen from data depen-
dencies between component variables. In the program shown
in Figure 3, Comp.var denotes the variable var belongs to the
component Comp.
1 // Bob.receive(data)
2 Bob.data1 := Alice.data;
3 // Bob.good()
4 Charlie.data := Bob.data2;
5 // Bob.bad()
6 Charlie.data := Bob.data1;
Figure 3: Simplified version of the running example.
To track flows between component variables, we label
all variables of a component with the security label of the
component. By extending the labeling function for variables
of components, we classify Alice.data as A, Bob.data1 and
Bob.data2 as B, and Charlie.data as C. The program does
not satisfy nontransitive noninterference because there is an
illegal flow from A to C; the content of Alice.data is directly
transmitted to Charlie.data via Bob.data1. If the program,
however, did not include the bad method in Bob, it would be
secure with respect to the nontransitive policy.
A. Security notions
We now present our model language and formal defini-
tions of security notions, i.e., transitive and nontransitive
noninterference for programs. To model the essence of these
characterizations, we assume a simple batch-job setting where
only the initial and final memories are observable (before and
after program execution). We will show how to extend our
results to a language with I/O in Section IV.
1As a visual cue, we will use the green color for nontransitive and blue
color for transitive notions throughout the paper.
e ::= v | x | e⊕ e
c ::= skip | x := e | if e then c else c | while e do c | c; c






⟨e1,M⟩ ⇓ v1 ⟨e2,M⟩ ⇓ v2





⟨e,M⟩ ⇓ v M′ = M[x → v]
⟨x ∶= e,M⟩ → ⟨stop,M′⟩
(WRITE)
c = if e then ctrue else cfalse ⟨e,M⟩ ⇓ b
⟨c,M⟩ → ⟨cb,M⟩
(IF)
c = while e do cbody ⟨e,M⟩ ⇓ true
⟨c,M⟩ → ⟨cbody; c,M⟩
(WHILE-T)










⟨stop; c,M⟩ → ⟨c,M⟩
(SEQ-II)
Figure 5: Language semantics.
Programs consist of multiple code components and a mem-
ory M ∶ Var → Val, a (total) mapping from a set of variables
Var to a set of values Val, partitioned by components Cmp
of the program. A variable x ∈ Var denotes x is allocated
at  ∈ Cmp. We write x where the component name is
unused. Using coarse-grained labeling, each component maps
to a security label, written ΓCmp ∶ Cmp → L. As a result,
all variables of a component are annotated with the same
label. Formally, ∀ ∈ Cmp.∀x ∈ Var.Γ(x) = ΓCmp() where
Γ ∶ Var → L. Note that we use Varc for the set of variables
that exist in program c.
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the syntax and semantics of our
model language. An execution configuration ⟨c,M⟩ is a pair
of a command c and a given memory M, and → introduces
the transition relation between configurations. For expressions,
⟨e,M⟩ ⇓ v denotes an expression e evaluates to a value v under
a memory M. We write →∗ for the reflexive and transitive
closure of the → relation, and →n for the n-step execution of
→.
We adopt termination-insensitive [32] noninterference that
ignores information leaks resulted from termination behavior
of the given program. NTNI is introduced by a termination-
insensitive notion for batch-job programs [17]. We extend the
model language to support I/O and lift the security notion to
progress-insensitive [3].
Note that the choices of termination- and progress-
sensitivity are orthogonal to nontransitivenesses of policies.
Our results (in particular, the lattice encoding) can be thus
replayed for other variants of noninterference.
Transitive Noninterference (TNI) For a given program,
classical noninterference guarantees if two memories agree on
variables at level l and lower, memories after the execution of
the program also agree on the variables at level l and lower.
Accordingly, an observer at level l can see the values of the
variables labeled as l or lower, called l-observable values.
Transitive noninterference stipulates l-observable final values
of a program only depend on initial values from l or lower
levels.
A transitive security policy is a triple  = ⟨L , ⊑,Γ ⟩
where L is a set of security labels and ⊑ ⊆ L × L is a
binary relation that forms a partially ordered set (reflexivity,
asymmetry, transitivity) on L and specifies permitted flows
between security levels. A labeling function Γ ∶ Var → L
maps a variable to a security label.
Transitive indistinguishability relation (= ) for a security
label l ∈ L is defined as follows. Two memories are
indistinguishable at level l if and only if values of variables
observable at the level l and lower are the same.
Definition 1 (Transitive Memory Indistinguishability). Two
memories M1 and M2 are transitively indistinguishable
at level l ∈ L , written M1
l= M2 if and only if
∀x ∈ Var.Γ (x)⊑ l ⇐⇒ M1(x) = M2(x).
We define transitive noninterference based on the indistin-
guishability relation between memories. A (batch-job) pro-
gram c satisfies termination-insensitive transitive noninterfer-
ence, written TNITI( , c), when for any two memories indis-
tinguishable at level l ∈ L , the computation of the program
c terminates for both and the l-observer cannot distinguish
the final memories.
Definition 2 (Termination-Insensitive Transitive Noninter-
ference). A program c satisfies TNITI( , c) if and only
if ∀l ∈ L .∀M1,M2.
(
M1





Nontransitive Noninterference (NTNI) The nontransitive
notion of noninterference demands that for a given program,
changes on variables at security level l can only influence
variables at the levels allowed by the policy. In this condition,
l-observable values are the content of variables labeled as l.
Hence, nontransitive noninterference ensures that l-observable
final values are only dependent on those initial values that can
flow to l, as stated in the policy.
A nontransitive security policy is a triple
 = ⟨L , ⊵ ,Γ ⟩ where L is a set of security labels,
Γ ∶ Var → L is a labeling function, and ⊵ is an
arbitrary flow relation specifying permitted flows (can-flow-to
relation [8]). We define C(l) = {l′|l′ ⊵ l} as the set of
levels that can flow to l, including itself. The only condition
for the relation is to be reflexive; no other properties, such as
transitivity, are required.
Nontransitive indistinguishability relations (= ) for a se-
curity label l ∈ L and a set of security labels  ⊆ L are
defined below. Two memories are indistinguishable at level l
if variables of the level l have the same values in those two.
Consistently, the relation holds for a set of labels if variables
of any level existing in the set be mapped to same values in
the two memories.
Definition 3 (Nontransitive Memory Indistinguishability). Two
memories M1 and M2 are nontransitively indistinguishable
at level l ∈ L , written M1
l= M2, if and only if
∀x ∈ Var.Γ (x) = l ⇐⇒ M1(x) = M2(x). The memories
are indistinguishable for a set of security levels  ⊆ L ,
written M1

= M2, if and only if ∀x ∈ Var.Γ (x) ∈  ⇐⇒
M1(x) = M2(x).
We use the indistinguishability relation between memories
to define nontransitive noninterference. A (batch-job) pro-
gram c satisfies termination-insensitive nontransitive nonin-
terference, written NTNITI( , c), if for any two memories
indistinguishable for the set of levels may influence variables
at l ∈ L , the program c gets terminated for both and the
l-observer cannot distinguish the final memories.
Definition 4 (Termination-Insensitive Nontransitive Noninter-
ference). A program c satisfies NTNITI( , c) if and only
if ∀l ∈ L .∀M1,M2.
(
M1





B. Relationship between NTNI and TNI
We first prove that NTNI is a generalization of TNI, and
then for the other side, we introduce the transpilation from
NTNI to TNI and discuss how a nontransitive policy can
be seen as transitive. We present an encoding to convert
nontransitive policies to transitive ones and show if a program
is secure with respect to a nontransitive policy, then a se-
mantically equivalent program satisfies an equivalent transitive
policy and vice versa.
Theorem 1 (From TNITI to NTNITI). For any program c
and any transitive security policy  = ⟨L , ⊑,Γ ⟩, there
exists a nontransitive security policy  = ⟨L , ⊵ ,Γ ⟩
where L = L , ⊵ = ⊑∗, and Γ = Γ such that
TNITI( , c) ⇐⇒ NTNITI( , c). Formally,
∀c.∀ .∃ .TNITI( , c) ⇐⇒ NTNITI( , c).
Proof. To conserve space, the proofs of all statements can








Figure 6: The powerset lattice for the running example.
The transpilation from NTNI to TNI includes mapping the
nontransitive policy to the corresponding transitive one and
rewriting the given program to be compatible with the policy
encoding. We establish a powerset lattice with the set of
security levels. To connect these two policies together, we
should map the components and their variables to the transitive
labels. Prior to labeling variables, a transformation in the
program is needed, which we call canonicalization.
In nontransitive policies, A⊵B means information from the
source level A can flow to the sink level B. Therefore, we allo-
cate two fresh variables for each component variable to capture
the source and sink of information. We prepend a sequence of
assignments from source variables to the component variables,
and we append assignments from the component variables to
sink variables. Then, we can label source and sink variables
separately with respect to the encoding to preserve the notion
of nontransitive policy.
Running exampleWe describe the transpilation from NTNI to
TNI for the running example shown in Figure 3. We form the
powerset lattice of labels used in the nontransitive policy as
the set of labels for the corresponding transitive policy, i.e.,
L = ℘({A,B,C}) and ⊑ =⊆ (see Figure 6). We transform
the program to be able to capture the notion of nontransitive
noninterference by assigning labels to variables. We add two
fresh variables for each component variable in the given
program to differentiate the source and sink of information
and label them according to the definition of NTNI.
Figure 7 demonstrates the program after the transformation,
which we call it the canonical version of the program. It
consists of three sections: (1) initial assignments from a
(source) variable to a temp variable (lines 2-5), (2) a copy of
the program where variables are replaced by temp variables
(lines 7-9), and (3) final assignments from temp to sink
variables (lines 12-15). It is obvious that the meaning of the
program is preserved in the transformation.
Next, we define the new labeling function for component
variables. As illuminated by annotations in Figure 6, for any
component variable Comp.x that the component Comp is labeled
as l in nontransitive policy, we label (source) variables Comp.x
as {l}, Comp.x_temp as the top element of the security lattice,
i.e., the set of all nontransitive labels, and Comp.x_sink as the
set of nontransitive labels that can flow to the variable, i.e.,
C(l). Thus, information flows from source variables (labeled
{l}) to sink variables (labeled C(l)) are carried through
internal temp variables. In Section III, we show how the
1 // init
2 Alice.data_temp := Alice.data;
3 Bob.data1_temp := Bob.data1;
4 Bob.data2_temp := Bob.data2;
5 Charlie.data_temp := Charlie.data;
6
7 Bob.data1_temp := Alice.data_temp;
8 Charlie.data_temp := Bob.data2_temp;
9 Charlie.data_temp := Bob.data1_temp;
10
11 // final
12 Alice.data_sink := Alice.data_temp;
13 Bob.data1_sink := Bob.data1_temp;
14 Bob.data2_sink := Bob.data2_temp;
15 Charlie.data_sink := Charlie.data_temp;
Figure 7: Canonical version of the running example.
presented type system updates the type of temp variables
based on data and control flows and verifies whether the final
assignments are secure.
Having the described labeling function, the canonical ver-
sion of the given program does not satisfy the transitive policy.
By tracking the sequence of lines 2, 7, 9, and 15 in Figure 7, an
explicit flow from {A} (level of Alice.data) to {B,C} (level
of Charlie.data_sink) is identified, which is not permitted
with respect to the transitive policy ({A} ⊈ {B,C}). However,
similar to the original program and the nontransitive policy, if
the program did not include the undesired flow, the program
would be considered secure.
Program canonicalization Algorithm 1 explains the trans-
formation for batch-job programs. First, for each vari-
able x in the program, we allocate two fresh variables
xtemp, xsink ∈ Var ⧵ Varc, and then apply the following trans-
formation on the given program. We use ++ to denote the
operator for string concatenation and the notation c [x → xtemp]
indicates renaming all occurrences of x in program c to xtemp
(in a capture-avoiding manner). We use Vartemp and Varsink to
point to the set of temp and sink variables, respectively.
Algorithm 1: Canonicalization algorithm for batch-job
programs.
Input : Program c
Output: Program Canonical(c)
init ∶= “ ”
final ∶= “ ”
foreach x ∈ Varc do
c [x → xtemp]
init ∶= init ++ “xtemp ∶= x; ”
final ∶= final ++ “; xsink ∶= xtemp”
end
Canonical(c) ∶= init ++ c ++ final
return Canonical(c)
We prove that the canonical version of the program keeps
the meaning and termination behavior of the original program,
yet the final values of variables are in the sink variables.
Lemma 1 (Semantic Equivalence Modulo Canonicalization).
For any program c, the semantic equivalence ≃C between










M′(x) = M′′(xtemp) = M′′(xsink) ∧M(x) = M′′(x)
)
.
The following lemmas are intermediate steps to show how
a nontransitive policy on a given program is reduced to a tran-
sitive policy using the powerset lattice resulted from the set of
nontransitive labels in combination with the canonical version
of the program. Lemma 2 proves that the transformation holds
a program secure with respect to a nontransitive policy if and
only if the original program is secure.
Lemma 2 (NTNITI Preservation under Canonicalization).
Any program c is secure with respect to a nontransi-
tive security policy  if and only if the canonical pro-
gram Canonical(c) is secure where ∀x ∈ Varc.Γ (xtemp) =
Γ (xsink) = Γ (x). Formally,
∀c.∀ .NTNITI( , c) ⇐⇒ NTNITI( ,Canonical(c)).
We define the powerset encoding of a nontransitive policy
to a transitive policy for canonical programs as follows.
Definition 5 (Transitive Encoding of Nontransitive Poli-
cies). Given a nontransitive policy  = ⟨L , ⊵,Γ ⟩
and a program c, the corresponding transitive policy  =
⟨L , ⊑,Γ ⟩ on the canonical version of the program is







Γ (x) = {Γ (x)}
Γ (xtemp) = L
Γ (xsink) = C(Γ (x))
.
As stated in Definition 5, the initial and final values of
an l-observable variable x of the given program are {l}-
and C(l)-observable in the canonical version, respectively.
Also, temp variables are internal and the top-level observer
only can see their final values, thus L -observable. The next
lemma demonstrates for any canonical program satisfying
a nontransitive policy, the program also complies with a
corresponding transitive policy and vice versa.
Lemma 3 (From NTNITI to TNITI for Canonical
Programs). Any canonical program Canonical(c) is
secure with respect to a nontransitive security policy
 where ∀x ∈ Varc.Γ (xtemp) = Γ (xsink) = Γ (x) if
and only if the canonical program is secure according
to the corresponding transitive security policy  .
We write ∀c.∀ .∃ . NTNITI( ,Canonical(c)) ⇐⇒
TNITI( ,Canonical(c)).
Finally, by connecting the previous lemmas, we prove that
any nontransitive policy on a given program can be modeled
as a transitive policy on the canonical version of the program.











Figure 8: Composition of transpiler and enforcement mecha-
nism.
Theorem 2 (From NTNITI to TNITI). For any program c
and any nontransitive security policy  = ⟨L , ⊵ ,Γ ⟩,
there exist a semantically equivalent (modulo canoni-
caliztion) program c′ and a transitive security policy
 = ⟨L , ⊑,Γ ⟩, as specified in Definition 5, such that
NTNITI( , c) ⇐⇒ TNITI( , c′). Formally,
∀ .∀c.∃ .∃c′. c ≃C c′ ∧ NTNITI( , c)⇐⇒ TNITI( , c′).
III. ENFORCEMENT TRANSPILED
The proposed enforcement mechanism for nontransitive
policies [17] is a type system that does not use subtyping, the
classical way to check transitive types, for information flow
verification. Instead, it tracks dependencies between program
variables and collects all security labels of flows into a
component variable throughout the program. Then it checks
whether the flows comply with the specified policy. Therefore,
the type system can enforce both nontransitive and transitive
policies.
To enforce a nontransitive policy, however, we can benefit
from the transpilation introduced in Section II and devise a
transitive type system for canonical programs. We employ a
(vanilla) flow-sensitive type system [14] enforcing the corre-
sponding transitive policy on transformed programs. The flow-
sensitivite type system investigates how components influence
variables of the program. Figure 8 illustrates the composition
of the transpiler and the enforcement mechanism.
We prove soundness of our transitive type system (Fig-
ure 9a) and investigate how it relates to the nontransitive type
system. Inspired by the notion, we present a nontransitive
type system for our model language (Figure 9b) and prove
the soundness property. Then, we show that the flow-sensitive
transitive type system accepts more secure programs compared
to the nontransitive one.
A. Enforcement mechanism
We present a flow-sensitive type system that enforces tran-
sitive policies for canonical programs. The type system allows
updates of security types through typing the program. When
an expression is assigned to a variable, the security type of the
variable changes to the join of security types of the expression
and the program counter, to capture explicit and implicit flows
(arisen from control dependencies) to the variable.
For a command c, judgments are in the form of pc⊢Γ{c} Γ′,
where pc ∈ L is the program counter label and the typ-
ing environment Γ ∶ Var → L will be updated to Γ′ after
execution of c. We make use of the structure of canonical
programs in the typing rules, presented in Figure 9a. The two
rules for assignments (rules TT-WRITE-I and TT-WRITE-II)
represent the essence of the type system. We know that only
temp and sink variables can be on the left-hand side of
an assignment in a canonical program. Assignments to sink
variables occur at the end of the program, i.e., the final section,
where the right-hand side of assignments are temp variables
(rule TT-WRITE-II). The type system allows changes to the
security types, except for sink variables, whose initial types
must be kept (rule TT-SUB). Otherwise, upgrading security
levels of sink variables might violate the soundness property
of the type system.
Running example Given the policy specified in the running
example, the type system rejects the canonical program shown
in Figure 7. The initial types of the variables are the sets of
labels introduced in Definition 5. Applying the typing rules,
the types of the variables Alice.data_temp, Bob.data1_temp,
and Charlie.data_temp are (at least) the same as the type
of Alice.data, which is {A}. The assignments in the final
section are well-typed except for the last one, where the type
of Charlie.data_sink is the set of labels can flow to C, i.e.,
{B,C}. Since {A} ⊈ {B,C}, the program is ill-typed with
respect to the given nontransitive policy. We will discuss more
examples in Section V.
The next theorem states soundness of the flow-sensitive type
system, which means if the type system accepts a canonical
program, then the program satisfies the transitive noninterfer-
ence, and consequently, the original program complies with
the nontransitive policy.
Theorem 3 (Soundness of Flow-Sensitive Transitive Type
System).
pc⊢Γ {Canonical(c)} Γ′ ⇐⇒ TNITI( ,Canonical(c)).
B. Relationship between nontransitive and flow-sensitive tran-
sitive type systems
The core idea of Lu and Zhang’s type system [17] is tracking
data and control dependencies between program variables
through type inference on information propagation history.
Then it guarantees flow relations from inferred labels of
dependencies to the specified label of the variable are stated
in the policy. Their flow-insensitive type system captures all
possible dependencies to a variable; thus it becomes less
permissive in comparison with a flow-sensitive type system.
Given the semantic relationship between nontransitive and
transitive policies, we demonstrate our flow-sensitive transi-
tive type system accepts all the well-typed programs in the
nontransitive type system, and more secure programs.
We present a nontransitive type system for our imperative
model language based on the essence of their type system. It
aggregates security labels of data and control dependencies of
variables through the program. For each assignment x ∶= e,
the type system checks permission of information flows from
the collected labels of the expression e and the program
counter to the specified label of the variable x.
Typing judgments are in the form of  ,Γ, pc⊢ c ∶ t that
indicates the type t is assigned to the command c with
respect to the program counter label pc ⊆ L in the typing
Γ⊢ v ∶ ⊥ (TT-VALUE) Γ⊢ v ∶ ∅ (NT-VALUE)
Γ⊢ x ∶ Γ(x) (TT-READ) Γ⊢ x ∶ Γ(x) (NT-READ)
Γ⊢ e1 ∶ t1 Γ⊢ e2 ∶ t2
Γ⊢ e1 ⊕ e2 ∶ t1 ⊔ t2
(TT-OPERATION)
Γ⊢ e1 ∶ t1 Γ⊢ e2 ∶ t2
Γ⊢ e1 ⊕ e2 ∶ t1 ∪ t2
(NT-OPERATION)
pc⊢Γ{skip} Γ (TT-SKIP)  ,Γ, pc⊢ skip ∶ t (NT-SKIP)
Γ⊢ e ∶ t x ∈ Vartemp
pc⊢Γ{x ∶= e} Γ[x → pc ⊔ t] (TT-WRITE-I) Γ⊢ e ∶ t Γ⊢ x ∶ t
∀l ∈ t ∪ pc.l ∈ Γ(x) ∧ l⊵(x)
 ,Γ, pc⊢ x ∶= e ∶ t
(NT-WRITE)x′ ∈ Vartemp x ∈ Varsink
pc ⊔ Γ(x′)⊑Γ(x)
pc⊢Γ{x ∶= x′} Γ
(TT-WRITE-II)
Γ⊢ e ∶ t
pc ⊔ t⊢Γ{ctrue} Γ′
pc ⊔ t⊢Γ{cfalse} Γ′
pc⊢Γ{if e then ctrue else cfalse} Γ′
(TT-IF)
Γ⊢ e ∶ t1
 ,Γ, pc ∪ t1 ⊢ ctrue ∶ t2
 ,Γ, pc ∪ t1 ⊢ cfalse ∶ t2
 ,Γ, pc⊢ if e then ctrue else cfalse ∶ t1 ∪ t2
(NT-IF)
Γ⊢ e ∶ t pc ⊔ t⊢Γ{cbody} Γ
pc⊢Γ{while e do cbody} Γ
(TT-WHILE)
Γ⊢ e ∶ t1  ,Γ, pc ∪ t1 ⊢ cbody ∶ t2
 ,Γ, pc⊢while e do cbody ∶ t1 ∪ t2
(NT-WHILE)
pc⊢Γ{c1} Γ′ pc⊢Γ′{c2} Γ′′
pc⊢Γ{c1; c2} Γ′′
(TT-SEQ)
 ,Γ, pc⊢ c1 ∶ t1  ,Γ, pc⊢ c2 ∶ t2
 ,Γ, pc⊢ c1; c2 ∶ t1 ∪ t2
(NT-SEQ)
pc1 ⊢Γ1{c} Γ′1
pc2 ⊑ pc1 Γ2 ⊑Γ1 Γ′1 ⊑Γ
′
2





Γ⊢ e ∶ t1 t1 ⊆ t2
Γ⊢ e ∶ t2
(NT-SUB-I)
 ,Γ, pc1 ⊢ c ∶ t1
pc2 ⊆ pc1 t1 ⊆ t2






Figure 9: (a) Transitive typing rules; (b) Nontransitive typing rules.
environments  ∶ Var → L and Γ ∶ Var → ℘(L ) where
∀x ∈ Var.(x) ∈ Γ(x). Figure 9b illustrates the typing rules
where  specifies the nontransitive levels of variables and Γ
predicts the set of labels that might influence the final value
of a variable in the program.
The most important rule is the one for typing assignments
(rule NT-WRITE). The set Γ(x) must contain all possible
information flows to the variable x in the program, which
is checked in the premise (t ∪ pc ⊆ Γ(x)), and then the
type system verifies whether those are permitted flows or not
(∀l ∈ t ∪ pc.l⊵(x)). Note that the specified label of a
variable (x) must be present in the set of dependencies Γ(x)
because the ⊵ relation is reflexive.
Running example The nontransitive type system tracks and
collects all the security labels a variable has a dependency on
through the program and checks whether they are compliant
with the permitted flows. Therefore, the program presented
in Figure 3 is rejected by the type system because the type
of Bob.data1 must be (at least) {A,B} to record the type
of Alice.data, which is {A} and A⊵B exists in the policy.
Consequently, the last assignment is ill-typed respecting the
typing environment and absence of A⊵C in the policy.
In the following, we prove soundness of the nontransitive
type system. Any well-typed program with respect to the non-
transitive typing rules satisfies nontransitive noninterference.
Theorem 4 (Soundness of Nontransitive Type System).
 ,Γ, pc⊢ c ∶ t ⇐⇒ NTNITI( , c).
On closer inspection, both type systems are sound but the
nontransitive type system is not as permissive as the flow-
sensitive mechanism. The flow-sensitive transitive type system
updates the labels of variables based on the flow of the
program in a more precise manner. The next theorem shows if
a program is secure under the nontransitive type system, the
flow-sensitive type system accepts the canonical version of the
program as well.
Theorem 5 (Flow-Sensitive Type System Covers Nontransitive
Type System).
 ,Γ1, pc⊢ c ∶ t ⇐⇒ pc⊢Γ2{Canonical(c)} Γ3,
where ∀x ∈ Varc.Γ3(xtemp) ⊑ Γ1(x)∧Γ2(x) = Γ3(x) = {(x)}∧
Γ2(xtemp) = L ∧ Γ2(xsink) = Γ3(xsink) = C((x)).
The counterexample program in Figure 10 demonstrates
the theorem does not hold in the other direction; there is
a well-typed program according to the flow-sensitive rules,
which gets rejected by the nontransitive type system. If we
swap the last two statements of the running example, as
shown in Figure 10, the nontransitive type system still rejects
the program; types of both sides of an assignment must be
the same (rule NT-WRITE). The flow-sensitive type system,
however, accepts the program because it detects that the last
assignment overwrites the final value of Charlie.data and
updates the label accordingly (rule TT-WRITE-I). It can be
shown that adding flow-sensitivity flavor to the nontransitive
type system enhances precision to the same level offered by
the flow-sensitive transitive type system.
1 // Bob.receive(data)
2 Bob.data1 := Alice.data;
3 // Bob.bad()
4 Charlie.data := Bob.data1;
5 // Bob.good()
6 Charlie.data := Bob.data2;
Figure 10: An example that shows the flow-sensitive type
system is more permissive than the nontransitive type system.
IV. EXTENSION WITH I/O
We extend the model language to support input and output
commands. In this setting, sources and sinks of information
are more tangible, as a better fit for real-world programs with
third-party components. Interestingly, we will observe a more
natural correspondence between nontransitive and transitive
security notions.
A. Security notions
Programs can receive inputs and produce outputs at any step
of computation. We include two new constructs input(x, l)
and output(x, l) for reading a value from the input channel at
security level l and sending a value to the output channel at
level l, respectively. This model entails a revision on security
notions where intermediate output values are observable as
well as the termination behavior of a program.
We naturally choose another notion of noninterference
named progress-insensitive [3], [13] (corresponding to CP-
security for reactive programs [5]) that demands if two pro-
gram inputs agree on values at security levels may influence
variables at l, the output sequence observable at level l
remains the same up to the point that one of the executions
diverges silently (without producing any output). Transitive
policies define an input/output value l-observable if the value
is at level l or lower, while an l-observer in a nontransitive
policy only sees values at level l. Note that the termination
behavior of a program is observable for all security levels in
both security notions.
Running example Recall the nontransitive policy of the
running example in Section II: A⊵B and B⊵C. The pro-
gram in Figure 11 violates progress-insensitive nontransitive
noninterference due to the presence of an implicit flow from
the input value of Alice.data with security level A to the
observable output at level C. Based on the input value, the
program sends an output value at level B or C. Therefore, the
observable outputs are different at levels B and C, depending
on the input value at level A.
1 input(Alice.data, A);
2 Bob.data1 := Alice.data;




Figure 11: Running example with I/O.
Figure 12 illustrates the syntax of our model language
supporting I/O. Evalution rules for input and output com-
mands are presented in Figure 13. We refer to Figure 23
(in Appendix) for the complete set of semantic rules. An
execution configuration ⟨c,M, I,O⟩ is a tuple consists of a
command c, a memory M, an input function I that maps
security levels to input channels, and an output channel O.
The relation → defines transitions between configurations. We
assume the environment is input total. We model program
inputs as a mapping from security levels to sequences of
values, written I(l) = v., where l ∈ L, v ∈ Val, and  is a
sequence of values. We define output behavior of a program
recursively by O = ∅ | ↻ | vl.O, where ↻ denotes silent
divergence. Based on the language semantics, we abstract away
details of computation steps and define output evaluation of
an execution. Definition 6 introduces the new relation ⇝ that
indicates an initial configuration ⟨c,M, I,∅⟩ evaluates to O.
Definition 6 (Output Behavior of A Program Execution).
The output behavior O generated by an initial execution
configuration ⟨c,M, I,∅⟩, written ⟨c,M, I,∅⟩ ⇝ O, is defined
as follows:
⟨c,M, I,∅⟩→∗⟨stop,M′, I′,O⟩
⟨c,M, I,∅⟩ ⇝ O
⟨c,M, I,∅⟩→∗⟨c′,M′, I′,O⟩
∀n ∈ ℕ. ⟨c′,M′, I′,O⟩→n⟨cn,Mn, In,O⟩ ∧ cn ≠ stop
⟨c,M, I,∅⟩ ⇝ O.↻
.
Transitive Noninterference (TNI) Classical noninterference
guarantees l-observable output behavior of a program only
depends on inputs from l or lower levels. A transitive security
policy  = ⟨L , ⊑ ,Γ ⟩ is a triple where L is a set of
security labels and ⊑ ⊆ L × L is a binary relation that
specifies permitted flows between security levels forming a
partially ordered set on L . A labeling function Γ ∶ Var → L
maps a variable to a security label.
The definition of progress-insensitive noninterference relies
on the definition of indistinguishability relations for inputs
and outputs. To define the relations, we should first describe
observable inputs and outputs at a security level l. An l-
observer can see the content of input channels at the security
e ::= v | x | e⊕ e
c ::= skip | x := e | if e then c else c | while e do c | c; c |
input(x, l) | output(x, l)
Figure 12: Language syntax with I/O.
c = input(x, l) I(l) = v.
I′ = I[l → ] M′ = M[x → v]
⟨c,M, I,O⟩ → ⟨stop,M′, I′,O⟩
(IO-INPUT)
c = output(x, l)
M(x) = v O′ = O. vl
⟨c,M, I,O⟩ → ⟨stop,M, I,O′⟩
(IO-OUTPUT)
Figure 13: Language semantics with I/O (selected rules).
level l and lower. We define observable output behavior at a
level l ∈ L by purging the values from an output sequence
which are not at the level l or lower.
Definition 7 (Transitive Observable Output Behavior). Given
an output behavior O including a sequence of output values
and termination behavior of a program execution. The subse-
quence of the output behavior observable at a security level









O O = ∅ ∨ O =↻
vl′ .O′|l O = vl′ .O





We call two program inputs indistinguishable at level
l ∈ L if input sequences of the levels l are the same as
well as lower levels.
Definition 8 (Transitive Input Indistinguishability). Two pro-
gram inputs I1 and I2 are indistinguishable at level l ∈ L ,
written I1
l= I2, if and only if ∀l′ ⊑ l. I1(l′) = I2(l′).
Two program outputs are indistinguishable at level l when
the sequences of observable outputs are exactly the same up
to the silent divergence in one of them. In other words, if both
of the output behaviors are terminating, then the l-observable
subsequences must be identical. Otherwise, the subsequences
must be the same until one of them reaches the ↻ event.
Definition 9 (Transitive Output Indistinguishability). Two
program outputs O1 and O2 are indistinguishable at level
l ∈ L , written O1




(∃O,O′.O1|l = O.↻ ∧O2|

l
= O.O′) ∨ (∃O,O′.O1|l =
O.O′ ∧ O2|l = O.↻).
Given the indistinguishability definitions, we are ready to
define the security condition. A program c satisfies progress-
insensitive transitive noninterference, written TNIPI( , c),
when for any two program inputs indistinguishable at level
l ∈ L , the output behaviors resulted from the execution of
the program are indistinguishable for the l-observer.
Definition 10 (Progress-Insensitive Transitive Noninterfer-
ence). A program c satisfies TNIPI( , c) if and only
if ∀l ∈ L .∀M.∀I1, I2. I1
l= I2 ∧ ⟨c,M, I1,∅⟩ ⇝ O1 ⇐⇒
∃O2.⟨c,M, I2,∅⟩ ⇝ O2 ∧ O1
l= O2.
Nontransitive Noninterference (NTNI) The nontransitive
notion of noninterference stipulates that l-observable output
behavior of a given program is only dependent on those inputs
that can flow to l, as stated in the policy. A nontransitive
security policy  = ⟨L , ⊵ ,Γ ⟩ is a triple where L is a
set of security labels, ⊵ is an arbitrary flow relation specifying
permitted flows, and Γ ∶ Var → L is a labeling function.
Similar to the transitive notion, we define indistinguisha-
bility relations for program inputs and outputs with respect to
definitions of observable inputs and outputs at a security level,
respectively. An l-observer can see the content of the input
channel at the level l and the subsequence of output values
at the level l as well as the divergence event.
Definition 11 (Nontransitive Observable Output Behavior).
Given an output behavior O including a sequence of output
values and termination behavior of a program execution. The
subsequence of the output behavior observable at a security


















Two program inputs are indistinguishable for a set of levels
 ⊆ L if input sequences of the levels member of  are
identical with each other.
Definition 12 (Nontransitive Input Indistinguishability). Two
program inputs I1 and I2 are indistinguishable for a set of lev-
els  ⊆ L , written I1

= I2, if and only if ∀l ∈ . I1(l) =
I2(l).
Similar to Definition 9, two program outputs are indistin-
guishable at level l ∈ L if the sequences of observable
outputs are the same until one of the executions diverges
silently.
Definition 13 (Nontransitive Output Indistinguishability). Two
program outputs O1 and O2 are indistinguishable at level
l ∈ L , written O1




(∃O,O′.O1|l = O.↻ ∧O2|

l
= O.O′) ∨ (∃O,O′.O1|l =
O.O′ ∧ O2|l = O.↻).
Having the indistinguishability relations in hand, we define
the noninterference notion for the nontransitive setting. A
program c satisfies progress-insensitive nontrasnitive nonin-
terference, written NTNIPI( , c), when for any two program
inputs indistinguishable for the set of levels may influence
variables at level l ∈ L , the output behaviors resulted from
the execution of the program are indistinguishable for the l-
observer.
Definition 14 (Progress-Insensitive Nontransitive
Noninterference). A program c satisfies NTNIPI( , c)
if and only if ∀l ∈ L .∀M.∀I1, I2. I1
C(l)=  I2 ∧
⟨c,M, I1,∅⟩ ⇝ O1 ⇐⇒ ∃O2.⟨c,M, I2,∅⟩ ⇝ O2 ∧ O1
l= O2.
B. Relationship between NTNI and TNI
We follow the same pattern to relate nontransitive and
transitive security definitions together. Constructing the power-
lattice encoding remains as before, although the transformation
algorithm is more straightforward for programs with input/out-
puts. Before we see that, the next theorem confirms NTNI
is still a generalization of TNI using the progress-insensitive
notion in the security definitions.
Theorem 6 (From TNIPI to NTNIPI). For any program c
and any transitive security policy  = ⟨L , ⊑ ,Γ ⟩, there
exists a nontransitive security policy  = ⟨L , ⊵ ,Γ ⟩
where L = L ,⊵ = ⊑∗, and Γ = Γ such that
TNIPI( , c) ⇐⇒ NTNIPI( , c). Formally,
∀c.∀ .∃ .TNIPI( , c) ⇐⇒ NTNIPI( , c).
We introduce the transpilation for programs with interme-
diate input/outputs. Similar to the batch-job style, we es-
tablish the powerset lattice out of nontransitive labels, i.e.,
L = ℘(L ) and ⊑ =⊆. However, the transformation algo-
rithm is quite simpler than canonicalization; only input and
output commands are required to be rewritten because of the
new security definition that considers only the relation between
program inputs and outputs.
Program transformation As explained in Algorithm 2, we
label sources of information at a security level l ∈ L as the
singleton set of a security level ({l}) and annotate sinks as
the set of labels that can flow to l, or C(l). More precisely,
we replace input(x, l) commands with input(x, {l}), and also
output(x, l) commands with output(x,C(l)) in the program.
Algorithm 2: Transformation algorithm for programs
with I/O.
Input : Program c
Output: Program Transform(c)
foreach x ∈ Varc do
c [input(x, l) → input(x, {l})]




Running example Figure 14 demonstrates how the transfor-
mation works on the running example. Each output command
explicitly specifies the set of labels that are permitted to
influence the output value. The transformed program does
not satisfy transitive noninterference because the presence of
output value at level {B,C} depends on an input value at level
{A}, which are incomparable in the security lattice. However,
1 input(Alice.data, {A});
2 Bob.data1 := Alice.data;




Figure 14: Transformed version of running example with I/O.
the flow from the input value to the output value at level {A,B}
is permitted because {A} ⊆ {A,B}.
It is obvious that the transformed version of a given program
preserves the meaning and termination behavior of the original
program, yet it changes the channel of output values. The input
and output values at the level l can be found on the input
channel with label {l} and the output channel labeled as C(l)
in the canonical version of the given program. The next lemma
shows the semantic relation between a given program and the
transformed one.
Lemma 4 (Semantic Equivalence Modulo Transformation).
For any program c, the semantic equivalence ≃T between







∧ ⟨c,M, I,∅⟩ ⇝ O ∧
⟨c′,M, I′,∅⟩ ⇝ O′ ∧ O′ = O [vl → vC(l)].
Then, we prove a nontransitive policy on a given pro-
gram (with intermediate inputs/outputs) can be reduced to a
transitive policy on the transformed version of the program.
Theorems 6 and 7 demonstrate the mutual relationship between
NTNI and TNI holds, even for programs with intermediate
observable values.
Theorem 7 (From NTNIPI to TNIPI). For any program c and
any nontransitive security policy = ⟨L , ⊵ ,Γ ⟩, there ex-
ist a semantically equivalent (modulo transformation) program
c′ and a transitive security policy  = ⟨L , ⊑ ,Γ ⟩ where c′ =
Transform(c), L = ℘(L ), ⊑ =⊆ and ∀x ∈ Varc.Γ (x) =
{Γ (x)} such that NTNIPI( , c) ⇐⇒ TNIPI( , c′). For-
mally,
∀ .∀c.∃ .∃c′. c ≃T c′ ∧ NTNIPI( , c)⇐⇒ TNIPI( , c′).
C. Enforcement mechanism
Figure 15 illustrates an excerpt from a flow-sensitive type
system enforcing transitive policies on transformed programs.
We refer to Figure 24 (in Appendix) for the complete set
of typing rules. The type system defines judgments of the
form pc⊢Γ{c} Γ′ where pc ∈ L is the program counter label,
and the typing environments Γ ∶ Var → L and Γ′ describe
the security levels of variables before and after executing the
command c, respectively. Security types of the variables get
updated freely through the program and capture the informa-
tion flows to the variable (rule IO-TT-WRITE).
The rules for typing input and output commands are the
most important ones. The typing environments before and after
executing an output command stay the same if the explicit
flows (Γ(x)) and implicit flows (pc) are permitted to the level
of the specified output channel (rule IO-TT-OUTPUT). For an
Γ⊢ e ∶ t
pc⊢Γ{x ∶= e} Γ[x → pc ⊔ t]
(IO-TT-WRITE)
pc⊑ l
pc⊢Γ{input(x, l)} Γ[x → l]
(IO-TT-INPUT)
pc ⊔ Γ(x)⊑ l
pc⊢Γ{output(x, l)} Γ
(IO-TT-OUTPUT)
Figure 15: Flow-sensitive typing rules with I/O (selected
rules).
input command input(x, l), the level of variable x is updated to
l if the program context does not make an illegal implicit flow
(rule IO-TT-INPUT). Otherwise, it might violate soundness
of the enforcement mechanism for programs like Figure 16,
where the execution of an input command in a high context
influences the received value of the next input command at
the same level.
1 if High.h then input(Low.x,{L}) else skip;
2 input(Low.y,{L});
3 output(Low.y,{L});
Figure 16: An example that shows an implicit flow by input
commands.
Running example Given the policy specified in the running
example, the type system rejects the transformed program
shown in Figure 14. The initial types of the variables are
the singleton set of the nontransitive security label. Following
the typing rules, the types of the variables Alice.data_temp
and Bob.data1_temp are (at least) {A}. The rule for output
commands demands that the specified level of the output value
must be higher than union of the level of the program context
and the level of variable x. The if branch is well-typed because
{A}⊔{B}⊑ {A,B}, yet the type system cannot offer a suitable
type for the else branch where {A} ⊔ {B}⋢ {B,C}.
Theorem 8 states soundness of the type system. If a trans-
formed program is well-typed, then it satisfies the transitive
noninterference, and by the result of Theorem 7, the original
program complies with the corresponding nontransitive policy.
Theorem 8 (Soundness of Flow-Sensitive Type System for
Programs with I/O).
pc⊢Γ {Transform(c)} Γ′ ⇐⇒ TNIPI( ,Transform(c)).
V. CASE STUDY WITH JOANA
We develop a prototype of our transpiler to analyze Java
programs. We follow the architecture illustrated in Figure 8
to implement a program canonicalizer and an input script
generator for JOANA [11], a flow-sensitive information-flow
analyzer for Java programs. The transpiler gets a path to
a Java project and generates the canonical version of the
program using Spoon [21], a library for transforming Java
programs. The user defines a nontransitive policy by labeling
the components (i.e., classes) of the program. Then, our tool
generates a script as the input of JOANA, which detects
possible illegal flows in the program. Our proof-of-concept
implementation can support as many programs as JOANA may
allow, as long as they are batch-job programs.
We evaluate our tool on four examples of nontransitive
policies to demonstrate the benefits of the reduction from
nontransitive to transitive policies in practice: Alice-Bob-
Charlie (the running example), Confused deputy, Bank logger,
and Low-High. The source code and materials of case studies
are available online [1]. We discuss the details of transpilation
and the JOANA’s script for the running example, and to
conserve space, we only report analysis results for the next
cases. In Appendix B, the source code of the programs in
question is presented.
A. Alice-Bob-Charlie (the running example)
We start with the running example as the first case, intro-
duced in Figure 1. To model the batch-job style, we modify
the code to include instances of components as fields of
Java classes. Following standard practices in object-oriented
programming, our prototype leverages composition relation-
ship [24] between classes where an object is a part of another
object. This leads to a hierarchy of objects, in which each
object is responsible for creation and deletion of required
objects of other classes. Assuming that no local variable
creates a new instance of a class, the execution starts from
the main object and continues in the underlying ones.
Given the main method as the starting point of the program,
constructors naturally provide placeholders for inserting the
init section (initiator methods), while the last line of the main
method is the placeholder for final assignments existing in
finalizer methods. By calling the finalizer method of the main
object, following the composition hierarchy, objects invoke the
finalizers as a chain. In the end, all of the sink fields are
assigned.
The transpiler suffices to inject the initiator and finalizer
methods per class. For readability, we slightly modify the
canonicalization algorithm. We add a source field assigned
to the initial value of the field in the original program, instead
of replacing occurrences of the variable with temp variables.
As an example, the canonical version of the program is shown
in Figure 17.
Considering the labels A, B, and C, for Alice, Bob, and
Charlie and with respect to the permitted flow (A⊵B,B⊵C),
the transpiler also generates the input script for JOANA.
Figure 18 displays the important snippet of it.
The first line describes the power-lattice, where e de-
notes the empty set as the bottom element. It is followed
by the list of annotations on field variables to distinguish
sources and sinks of information per class. For example, the
line sink Charlie.data_sink BC means Charlie.data_sink
is a sink variable with the security level BC (the set of
nontransitive labels can flow to C). The last command of
the script triggers the flow-sensitive information flow anal-
ysis. As the result of the analysis, JOANA reports the
security violation Illegal flow from Alice.data_source to
1 public class Alice {
2 private int data_source = 0,data,data_sink;
3 private Bob b;
4 public void initiator(){




9 b = new Bob();
10 }
11 public static void main(String[] args){









21 public void finalizer(){




1 public class Bob {
2 private int data1_source=0,data1,data1_sink;
3 private int data2_source=1,data2,data2_sink;
4 private Charlie c;
5 public void initiator(){
6 data1 = data1_source;




11 c = new Charlie();
12 }
13 public void receive(int x){ data1 = x; }
14 public void good(){ c.receive(data2); }
15 public void bad(){ c.receive(data1); }
16 public void finalizer(){
17 data1_sink = data1;




1 public class Charlie {
2 private int data_source, data, data_sink;
3 public void initiator(){data = data_source;}
4 public Charlie(){ initiator(); }
5 public void receive(int x){ data = x; }
6 public void finalizer(){ data_sink = data; }
7 }
Figure 17: The canonical version of Alice-Bob-Charlie.
Charlie.data_sink, visible for BC, which captures the un-
desired explicit flow.
Omitting invocation of the bad method yields a secure
program. In this case, JOANA reports No violations found




3 source Alice.data_source A
4 sink Alice.data_sink A
5 source Bob.data1_source B
6 sink Bob.data1_sink AB
7 source Bob.data2_source B
8 sink Bob.data2_sink AB
9 source Charlie.data_source C
10 sink Charlie.data_sink BC
11 run classical-ni
Figure 18: A snippet of JOANA script for Alice-Bob-Charlie.
B. Confused deputy
We benefit from the fact that nontransitive information flow
control supports enforcing both confidentiality and integrity
policies. The confused deputy problem [12] occurs in a
situation when an untrusted component is able to manipulate
a trusted component and misuse its authority to execute a
sensitive operation. It is an integrity problem since the policy
states if the attacker is not permitted to alter a resource, then
there must not be any way to do so, directly or by using a
deputy. We adopt Lu and Zhang’s code [17] as a starting point
to represent the confused deputy problem.
Figure 19 illustrates the skeleton of the source code. We
make use of four classes: Library, Service, Downloaded_Code,
and Trusted_Code. Values in Library are protected and
only Service is privileged to access them. The class
Downloaded_Code is third-party code that cannot access to
Library, while Trusted_Code is completely trusted. Invok-
ing addLog method of Service is permitted because it up-
dates a non-executable log file in Service, but the process
method of Library must not be called with data from
Downloaded_Code via Service. To rephrase the integrity pol-
icy, Downloaded_Code should not have any effects on the
sensitive component Library, directly or indirectly, while
Trusted_Code can. Given the initial letters of the component
names as their labels, the specified policy is D⊵ S, S⊵L, T ⊵ S
and T ⊵L.
On the other hand, Downloaded_Code must not retrieve
Library’s information through invoking the query method by
Service. Taking confidentiality policies into account, we add
flow relations L⊵ S, S⊵D, L⊵T , and S⊵T to exclude the
illegal flows from Library to Downloaded_Code violating data
secrecy. To sum up, the intended policy is the aggregation
of the integrity and confidentiality policies, which are defined
uniformly by the aforementioned nontransitive flows.
The transpiler generates the canonical version of the
program and annotates sources and sinks of information
in classes. JOANA discovers the violations in the
program and reports the two existing illegal flows:
Illegal flow from Downloaded_Code.data_source to
Library.printValue_sink, visible for LS (integrity)
and Illegal flow from Library.someValue_source
to Downloaded_Code.result_sink, visible for DS
(confidentiality).
1 public class Library {
2 private int someValue = 5, printValue = 0;
3 ...
4 public void process(int src){
5 printValue = src;
6 }




1 public class Service {
2 private int logFile = 0;
3 private Library library;
4 ...
5 public void addLog(int x, int y){
6 logFile += x + y ;
7 }
8 public void print(int data){
9 library.process(data);
10 }




1 public class Downloaded_Code {
2 private int data = 7, key = 4, result;
3 private Service service;
4 ...
5 public static void main(String[] args){
6 Downloaded_Code dc = new Downloaded_Code();
7 dc.operation();
8 }
9 private void operation(){
10 service.addLog(data, key);
11 service.print(data);
12 result = service.query(key);
13 }
14 }
Figure 19: The skeleton of Confused deputy source code.
A secure version of the program is the one without call-
ing service.print(data) and service.query(key) in the
operation method. Now information from Downloaded_Code
(as {D}) influences only logFile in Service (as {D, L, S, T}),
which is allowed by the policy. JOANA also confirms security
of the program by running the same script on the canonical
version of the revised program.
C. Bank logger
We discuss another example in which two bank services
for processing customers’ information (Bank) and logging
their public information (Logger) are totally separated. A
client component (BankLog) is developed to communicate with
both services at the same time. Figure 20 focuses on the
important parts of the source code. The two components
Bank and BankLog can mutually access each other’s informa-
tion, although Logger may read insensitive information. Thus,
Logger must not interfere with Bank directly or indirectly. We
label Bank, Logger, and BankLog components as B, L, and
1 public class Bank {
2 private int id = 20;
3 ...
4 public int getBalance(int x){




1 public class BankLog {
2 private int userId = 20, balance;
3 private Bank b; private Logger l;
4 ...
5 private void operation(){
6 balance = b.getBalance(userId);




Figure 20: An excerpt from Bank logger source code.
C, respectively. Consequently, the intended policy is C⊵B,
B⊵C, and C⊵L.
The current implementation of the program violates
the policy by two implicit flows. The getBalance method
checks whether the id exists, and BankLog only requests
for logging if the sensitive value balance is positive.
Executing the JOANA script on the canonical version of the
program generates the following report: Illegal flow from
Bank.id_source to Logger.logFile_sink, visible for CL
(flow #1) and Illegal flow from Bank.balance_source to
Logger.logFile_sink, visible for CL (flow #2).
To secure the program, the log content must not be influ-
enced by sensitive information. One possible way to repair
the program is logging the number of accesses to the client
component BankLog. Hence, we replace lines 7 and 8 of
BankLog (in the operation method) with l.append(1). With
this change, JOANA accepts the canonical version of the
program using the same script.
D. Low-High
The previous examples included more than two components,
which allowed us to contrast transitive and nontransitive poli-
cies. The following example demonstrates the compatibility
with the baseline case of the two-level security policy. The
program (in Appendix B) contains two components Alice and
Bob, where Alice updates her data influenced by Bob’s secret
value. We define the nontransitive policy L⊵H such that L is
the label of Alice and H is for Bob.
1 setLattice e<=L,e<=H,L<=LH,H<=LH
2 source Alice.data_source L
3 sink Alice.data_sink L
4 source Bob.secret_source H
5 sink Bob.secret_sink LH
6 source Bob.data_source H
7 sink Bob.data_sink LH
Figure 21: A snippet of JOANA script for Low-High.
The transpiler transforms the program and generates
the input script for JOANA, as can be seen in Fig-
ure 21. Therefore, JOANA analyzes the program and
reports message Illegal flow from Bob.secret_source to
Alice.data_sink, visible for L expresses the security vio-
lation caused by the implicit flow.
Removing the illegal flow (line 13 in Alice) makes the
program secure, which is verified by running the JOANA
script on the canonical version of the modified program.
VI. ALTERNATIVE POLICIES AND ENCODINGS
Fine-grained policies While the main motivation for non-
transitive types is enforcing coarse-grained information-flow
policies, where labels represent components, the notion of
nontransitive security is not limited to module separation [17].
Other real-world scenarios such as policies in social media
(e.g., “only my friends can see my photo but not friends
of my friends”) also naturally match nontransitive policies.
Our framework can thus be generalized to decouple the
flow-to relation from component labels, allowing fine-grained
nontransitive policies.
Scalability The proposed transpiler employs the power-lattice
encoding that expands the number of security levels expo-
nentially. For the type system, however, its time and space
complexity do not depend on the size of the lattice. The
reason is that we never need to store the lattice, as the flow-to
relation is implicitly derived from its elements. In an off-the-
shelf deployment of JOANA, there is no time blowup, but
we cannot avoid the space blowup because JOANA is lattice-
agnostic. Making JOANA aware of the power-lattice nature of
the lattice (e.g., in the style of DLM [19]) can help avoiding
the blowup in the current implementation.
Alternative encodings A power-lattice encoding enables us
to support declassification and dynamic policies. However,
when such generality is not needed, we can reduce the size
of the lattice by alternative encodings, with the cost of losing
granularity of information stored in security labels.
We identify the soundness constraint for a nontransitive-to-
transitive policy encoding as l⊵ l′ ⇐⇒ lsource ⊑ l′sink, where
source and sink variables of a component are labeled as lsource
and lsink, respectively, when the component has label l in the
nontransitive setting (recall that ⊵ is reflexive). Note that the
powerset lattice encoding indeed meets the condition because





(see Figure 6). Among various lattices satisfying
the constraint, a minimal one is desirable, i.e., the one with
the smallest set of labels.
We present a so-called source-sink lattice encoding that
satisfies the soundness constraint and reduces the size of
the lattice from exponential to polynomial. We start with
a source-sink partial order where for all l ∈ L , there are
lsrc, lsnk ∈ L such that lsrc ⊑ lsnk, due to reflexivity of
the ⊵ relation. Then, according to the soundness constraint,
we include transitive relations between levels based on the











Figure 22: (a) A source-sink lattice encoding for the running
example; (b) A minimal lattice.
constitute a lattice, we apply the Dedekind–MacNeille com-
pletion algorithm [4] to compute the smallest lattice containing
the partial order. If a unique least upper (resp. greatest lower)
bound for any pairs of source (resp. sink) levels does not exist,
it adds an intermediary level between two source and two sink
levels such that the intermediary level is the lub of the source
levels and the glb of the sinks. It also makes one top and
one bottom element for the lattice. Figure 22a illustrates the
resulting source-sink lattice for the running example (A⊵B
and B⊵C).
In the worst case, the size of the lattice is O(|L |2) and the
time complexity of the algorithm is O(|L |4), as proved in
Appendix A. Furthermore, optimization techniques can make
the partial order compact, before constructing the lattice out
of it; for example, any pairs of lsrc and lsnk coincide in the
partial order when one of them is only in relation with the
other one, not any other levels. Figure 22b depicts the minimal
source-sink lattice for the nontransitive policy in question;
observe how Asink and Csource are collapsed.
We demonstrate the NTNI-to-TNI tranpilation defined for
a source-sink lattice, in comparison with the power-lattice
encoding, by replacing {l} with lsrc and C(l) with lsnk in the
labeling function and program transformation. In Appendix A,
we formally introduce the transpilation using a source-sink
lattice. We make use of the program canonicalization for
batch-job programs and define the transitive encoding of
a nontransitive policy based on a given source-sink lattice
(Definition 15). We prove that any nontransitive policy on a
program can be reduced to a corresponding transitive policy
on a semantically equivalent program (Theorem 9). For the
enforcement mechanism, we prove that the presented flow-
sensitive type system, while a source-sink lattice is in place,
is sound and more permissive than the nontransitive type
system (Theorems 10 and 11). Moreover, our results can be
generalized to programs with intermediate inputs and outputs,
where the program transformation algorithm replaces the level
of input and output commands to lsrc and lsnk, respectively
(Algorithm 3 and Theorem 12). We also prove that the flow-
sensitive type system for programs with I/O is compatible with
a source-sink lattice (Theorem 13).
VII. RELATED WORK
Our starting point is the special-purpose notions Nontransi-
tive Noninterference (NTNI) and Nontransitive Types (NTT)
by Lu and Zhang [17]. Our work demonstrates how to cast
NTNI as classical noninterference on a lattice and how to
improve the precision of NTT by classical flow-sensitive
analysis.
Nontransitive noninterference is not to be confused by
intransitive noninterference. Intransitive noninterference was
introduced by Rushby [25] and explored by, amongst others,
Roscoe and Goldsmith [23], Mantel and Sands [18], and Ron
van der Meyden [30]. Intransitive noninterference is intended
to address the where dimension of declassification [27]. The
typical scenario for intransitive noninterference is ensuring that
sensitive data is passed through a trusted encryption module
before it is released. For example, security labels might be
low, encrypt, and high, ordered by high → encrypt → low
while high ↛ low. Like nontransitive policies, intransitive
policies do not assume transitive policies. However, there is a
fundamental difference between nontransitive and intransitive
policies: intransitive noninterference allows low information to
be (indirectly) dependent on high. In the encryption module
scenario, this means that changes in the (high) plaintext may
reflect in the changes in the (low) ciphertext. In contrast,
nontransitive policy A⊵B and B⊵C guarantees that there are
no information dependencies from A to C whatsoever.
Further approaches to declassification introduce decentral-
ized hierarchies and dynamic policies. Myers and Liskov’s
DLM [19] is based on transitive policies that encode ownership
in the labels. The goal is to allow declassification only if it
is allowed by the owner(s) of the data. DC labels [28] by
Stefan et al. models a setting of mutual distrust without relying
on a centralized principal hierarchy. DC labels incorporate
formulas over principals, modeling can-flow-to relation by
logical implication. FLAM [2] by Arden et al. explores robust
authorization to mitigate delegation loopholes in policies like
DLM. Jia and Zdancewic [15] encode security types using
authorization logic in a programming language for access
control. Their encoding does not assume transitivity and it
needs to be encoded as explicit delegations. Swamy et al. [29]
and Broberg et al. [6] explore the effects of dynamic policy
updates on the transitivity of flows. Broberg et al. call a flow
time-transitive if information leaks from A to C via B even
if no flows from A to C are allowed at any given time. This
can happen when the policy of allowing flows from A to B
is dynamically updated to allow flows from B to C. Time-
transitivity is not in the scope of our work because our policies
are static.
Rajani and Garg [22] explore the granularity of policies
for information flow control. They show that fine-grained type
systems that track the propagation of values are as expressive
as coarse-grained type systems that track the propagation of
context. Vassena et al. [31] expand the study to the dynamic
setting. Xiang and Chong [33] use opaque labeled values in
their study of dynamic coarse-grained information flow control
for Java-like languages. However, in both cases, the considered
policies are transitive. An interesting avenue for future work
is to explore whether these approaches can be integrated with
ours to be able to handle nontransitive policies.
Our proof-of-concept implementation of the flow-sensitive
analysis for Java draws on Hammer and Snelting’s
JOANA [10], [11]. Note that our reduction results are general,
enabling the use of other practical flow-sensitive analyses
like Pidgin [16] by Johnson et al. for tracking nontransitive
policies.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In order to support module-level coarse-grained
information-flow policies, Nontransitive Noninterference
(NTNI) and Nontransitive Types (NTT) have been suggested
recently as a new security condition and enforcement. In
contrast to Denning’s classical lattice model, NTNI and NTT
assume no transitivity of the underlying flow relation. NTNI
and NTT, in the form they were proposed, are nonstandard,
requiring the development of nonstandard semantic machinery
to reason about NTNI and the development of nonstandard
enforcement techniques to track NTT.
This paper demonstrates that despite the different aims
and intuitions of nontransitive policies compared to classical
transitive policies, nontransitive noninterference can in fact be
reduced to classical transitive noninterference.
On the security characterization side, we show that NTNI
corresponds to classical noninterference on a lattice that
records source-to-sink relations derived from nontransitive
policies. On the enforcement side, we devise a lightweight
program transformation that enables us to leverage standard
flow-sensitive information-flow analyses to enforce nontransi-
tive policies. Further, we improve the permissiveness over the
nonstandard NTT enforcement while retaining the soundness.
We show that our security characterization and enforcement
results naturally generalize to a language with intermediate
input and outputs. An immediate practical benefit of our work
is the implication that there is no need for dedicated design and
implementation for the enforcement of nontransitive policies
for practical programming languages. Instead, we can leverage
state-of-the-art flow-sensitive information-flow tools, which
we demonstrate by utilizing JOANA to enforce nontransitive
policies for Java programs.
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⟨e1,M⟩ ⇓ v1 ⟨e2,M⟩ ⇓ v2
⟨e1 ⊕ e2,M⟩ ⇓ v1 ⊕ v2
(IO-OPERATION)
Command Evaluation
⟨skip,M, I,O⟩ → ⟨stop,M, I,O⟩
(IO-SKIP)
⟨e,M⟩ ⇓ v M′ = M[x → v]
⟨x ∶= e,M, I,O⟩ → ⟨stop,M′, I,O⟩
(IO-WRITE)
c = if e then ctrue else cfalse ⟨e,M⟩ ⇓ b
⟨c,M, I,O⟩ → ⟨cb,M, I,O⟩
(IO-IF)
c = while e do cbody ⟨e,M⟩ ⇓ true
⟨c,M, I,O⟩ → ⟨cbody; c,M, I,O⟩
(IO-WHILE-T)
c = while e do cbody ⟨e,M⟩ ⇓ false
⟨c,M, I,O⟩ → ⟨stop,M, I,O⟩
(IO-WHILE-F)
c = input(x, l) I(l) = v.
I′ = I[l → ] M′ = M[x → v]
⟨c,M, I,O⟩ → ⟨stop,M′, I′,O⟩
(IO-INPUT)
c = output(x, l)
M(x) = v O′ = O. vl
⟨c,M, I,O⟩ → ⟨stop,M, I,O′⟩
(IO-OUTPUT)
⟨c1,M, I,O⟩ → ⟨c′1,M
′, I′,O′⟩
⟨c1; c2,M, I,O⟩ → ⟨c′1; c2,M
′, I′,O′⟩
(IO-SEQ-I)
⟨stop; c,M, I,O⟩ → ⟨c,M, I,O⟩
(IO-SEQ-II)
Figure 23: Language semantics with I/O.
APPENDIX
A. Source-sink encoding
We define the source-sink lattice encoding of a nontransitive
policy to a transitive policy for canonical programs as follows.
Definition 15 (Transitive Encoding of Nontransitive
Policies). Given a nontransitive policy  = ⟨L , ⊵,Γ ⟩
and a program c, a corresponding transitive policy
 = ⟨L , ⊑,Γ ⟩ on the canonical version of the
program is L ⊇ {lsrc, lsnk|l ∈ L } ∪ {⊤,⊥} and
∀l, l′ ∈ L .l⊵ l′ ⇐⇒ lsrc ⊑ l′snk (⊵ is reflexive) such
that ⟨L , ⊑⟩ constitutes a lattice, and






Γ (x) = lsrc
Γ (xtemp) = ⊤
Γ (xsink) = lsnk
.
As stated in Definition 15, the initial and final values of
an l-observable variable x of the given program are lsrc-
Γ⊢ v ∶ ⊥
(IO-TT-VALUE)
Γ⊢ x ∶ Γ(x)
(IO-TT-READ)
Γ⊢ e1 ∶ t1 Γ⊢ e2 ∶ t2




Γ⊢ e ∶ t
pc⊢Γ{x ∶= e} Γ[x → pc ⊔ t]
(IO-TT-WRITE)
Γ⊢ e ∶ t
pc ⊔ t⊢Γ{ctrue} Γ′
pc ⊔ t⊢Γ{cfalse} Γ′
pc⊢Γ{if e then ctrue else cfalse} Γ′
(IO-TT-IF)
Γ⊢ e ∶ t pc ⊔ t⊢Γ{cbody} Γ
pc⊢Γ{while e do cbody} Γ
(IO-TT-WHILE)




pc⊢Γ{input(x, l)} Γ[x → l]
(IO-TT-INPUT)









Figure 24: Flow-sensitive typing rules with I/O.
and lsnk-observable in the canonical version, respectively.
Also, only the top-level observer can see final values of
internal temp variables, thus makes them ⊤-observable. The
next lemma demonstrates that for any canonical program
satisfying a nontransitive policy, the program also complies
with a corresponding transitive policy and vice versa.
Lemma 5 (From NTNITI to TNITI for Canonical
Programs). Any canonical program Canonical(c) is
secure with respect to a nontransitive security policy
 where ∀x ∈ Varc.Γ (xtemp) = Γ (xsink) = Γ (x) if
and only if the canonical program is secure according
to a corresponding transitive security policy  . We
write ∀c.∀ .∃ . NTNITI( ,Canonical(c)) ⇐⇒
TNITI( ,Canonical(c)).
Therefore, we prove that any nontransitive policy on a given
program can be modeled as a transitive policy on the canonical
version of the program.
Theorem 9 (From NTNITI to TNITI). For any program c
and any nontransitive security policy  = ⟨L , ⊵ ,Γ ⟩,
there exist a semantically equivalent (modulo canoni-
caliztion) program c′ and a transitive security policy
 = ⟨L , ⊑,Γ ⟩, as specified in Definition 15, such that
NTNITI( , c) ⇐⇒ TNITI( , c′). Formally,
∀ .∀c.∃ .∃c′. c ≃C c′ ∧ NTNITI( , c)⇐⇒ TNITI( , c′).
The next theorem states that the flow-sensitive type system
is sound; in other words, if the type system accepts a canonical
program, then the program satisfies the transitive noninterfer-
ence, and consequently, the original program complies with
the nontransitive policy.
Theorem 10 (Soundness of Flow-Sensitive Transitive Type
System).
pc⊢Γ {Canonical(c)} Γ′ ⇐⇒ TNITI( ,Canonical(c)).
The next theorem shows if a program is secure under
the nontransitive type system, the flow-sensitive type system
accepts the canonical version of the program as well.
Theorem 11 (Flow-Sensitive Type System Covers Nontransi-
tive Type System).
 ,Γ1, pc⊢ c ∶ t ⇐⇒ pc⊢Γ2{Canonical(c)} Γ3,
where ∀x ∈ Varc.Γ3(xtemp)⊑
⨆
l∈Γ1(x)
lsrc∧(x) = l ⇐⇒ Γ2(x) =
Γ3(x) = lsrc ∧ Γ2(xtemp) = ⊤ ∧ Γ2(xsink) = Γ3(xsink) = lsnk.
We also introduce the transpilation for programs with
intermediate input/outputs. Similar to the batch-job style,
we establish a source-sink lattice out of nontransi-
tive labels, i.e., L ⊇ {lsrc, lsnk|l ∈ L } ∪ {⊤,⊥} and
∀l, l′ ∈ L .l⊵ l′ ⇐⇒ lsrc ⊑ l′snk (⊵ is reflexive) such
that ⟨L , ⊑⟩ is a lattice. In the program transformation al-
gorithm, only the levels of input and output commands are
modified because the notion of progress-insensitive noninter-
ference only focuses on the relation between program inputs
and outputs.
Program transformation As explained in Algorithm 3, we
label sources and sinks of information at a security level
l ∈ L as lsrc and lsnk, respectively. More precisely, we
replace input(x, l) commands with input(x, lsrc), and also
output(x, l) commands with output(x, lsnk) in the program.
Algorithm 3: Transformation algorithm for programs
with I/O.
Input : Program c
Output: Program Transform(c)
foreach x ∈ Varc do
c [input(x, l) → input(x, lsrc)]




Obviously, the transformed version of a given program
preserves the meaning and termination behavior of the original
program, yet it changes the channel of output values. The input
and output values at the level l can be found on the input
channel with label lsrc and the output channel labeled as lsnk
in the canonical version of the given program. The next lemma
shows the semantic relation between a given program and the
transformed one.
Lemma 6 (Semantic Equivalence Modulo Transformation).
For any program c, the semantic equivalence ≃T between







∧ ⟨c,M, I,∅⟩ ⇝ O ∧
⟨c′,M, I′,∅⟩ ⇝ O′ ∧ O′ = O [vl → vlsnk ].
Then, we prove a nontransitive policy on a given program
(with intermediate inputs/outputs) can be reduced to a transi-
tive policy on the transformed version of the program.
Theorem 12 (From NTNIPI to TNIPI). For any program
c and any nontransitive security policy  = ⟨L , ⊵ ,Γ ⟩,
there exist a semantically equivalent (modulo transformation)
program c′ and a transitive security policy  = ⟨L , ⊑ ,Γ ⟩
where c′ = Transform(c), ⟨L , ⊑ ⟩ is a corresponding source-
sink lattice and ∀x ∈ Varc. l = Γ (x) ⇐⇒ Γ (x) = lsrc such
that NTNIPI( , c) ⇐⇒ TNIPI( , c′). Formally,
∀ .∀c.∃ .∃c′. c ≃T c′ ∧ NTNIPI( , c)⇐⇒ TNIPI( , c′).
Theorem 13 (Soundness of Flow-Sensitive Type System for
Programs with I/O).
pc⊢Γ {Transform(c)} Γ′ ⇐⇒ TNIPI( ,Transform(c)).
Proof of complexity of source-sink lattice encoding. We
know that source levels are incomparable in the source-sink
partial order, the same for sink levels. Thus, if there is
not a quadruple of levels, two sources and two sinks, such
that source levels are in relation with both of the sinks,
then adding a top and a bottom element yields the smallest
lattice. To do so, we detect cycles of length four in the






.O(|L |2) = O(|L |4) for the graph that has






cycles exist at most. For each cycle, we add one
intermediary level to the partial order, as the unique least
upper (resp. greatest lower) bound of the source (resp. sink)
levels. Hence, in the worst case, the resulting lattice adds
|L |2
2 + 2 more levels to the partial order, thus O(|L |
2) is
the size of the lattice. It is also proven that the Dedekind-
MacNeille completion takes O(r2) where r is the number of
elements in the lattice [4], [9], [20], thus O(|L |4).
B. Case studies
Alice-Bob-Charlie
1 public class Alice {
2 private int data = 13;
3 private Bob b;
4 public Alice(){
5 b = new Bob();
6 }
7 public static void main(String[] args){
8 Alice a = new Alice();
9 a.operation();
10 }






1 public class Bob {
2 private int data1 = 0, data2 = 42;
3 private Charlie c;
4 public Bob(){
5 c = new Charlie();
6 }
7 public void receive(int x){
8 data1 = x;
9 }
10 public void good(){
11 c.receive(data2);
12 }




1 public class Charlie {
2 private int data;
3 public Charlie(){ }
4 public void receive(int x){




1 public class Library {
2 private int someValue = 5;
3 private int printValue = 0;
4 public Library(){ }
5 public void process(int src){
6 printValue = src;
7 }




1 public class Service {
2 private int logFile = 0;
3 private Library library;
4 public Service(){
5 library = new Library();
6 }
7 public void addLog(int x, int y){
8 logFile += x + y ;
9 }
10 public void print(int data){
11 library.process(data);
12 }




1 public class Downloaded_Code {
2 private int data = 7, key = 4, result;
3 private Service service;
4 public Downloaded_Code(){
5 service = new Service();
6 }
7 public static void main(String[] args){
8 Downloaded_Code dc = new Downloaded_Code();
9 dc.operation();
10 }
11 private void operation(){
12 service.addLog(data, key);
13 service.print(data);




1 public class Bank {
2 private int id = 20, balance = 100;
3 public Bank(){ }
4 public int getBalance(int x){





1 public class Logger {
2 private static int logFile;
3 public Logger(){ }
4 public void append(int x){
5 logFile += x;
6 }
7 }
1 public class BankLog {
2 private int userId = 20, balance;
3 private Bank b;
4 private Logger l;
5 public BankLog(){
6 b = new Bank();
7 l = new Logger();
8 }
9 public static void main(String[] args){
10 BankLog bl = new BankLog();
11 bl.operation();
12 }
13 private void operation(){
14 balance = b.getBalance(userId);





1 public class Bob {
2 private int secret = 100, data;
3 public Bob(){ }
4 public void receive(int x){
5 data = x;
6 }




1 public class Alice {
2 private int data = 10;
3 private Bob bob;
4 public Alice(){
5 bob = new Bob();
6 }
7 public static void main(String[] args){
8 Alice a = new Alice();
9 a.sendDataToBob();
10 }
11 public void sendDataToBob(){
12 bob.receive(data);
13 if (bob.getSecret() > data)
14 data++;
15 }
16 }
